p>Professor Froeb recently gave a talk entitled “Innovation, Patent Hold-Up, and Equilibrium Effects of RAND Commitments,” which was based upon a paper co-authored with Bernhard Ganglmai. The presentation addressed the following policy question: can ex post litigation help mediate transactions between creators and users of intellectual property? Using models of bilateral contracting between creators and users, sequential investment and double-sided holdup, three main results were found. First, ex post litigation is sometimes better than nothing, e.g. it solves manufacturer’s holdup but worsens innovator’s holdup. Second, bilateral contracts dominate ex post litigation, e.g. it solves manufacturer’s holdup and (indirectly) mitigates innovator’s holdup. Finally, ex post litigation nullifies effects of contract.
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- CE Academic Affiliate Professor Luke Froeb recently gave a presentation on Patent Ambush at Vanderbilt University