CE Director Michael J. Doane, CE Academic Affiliates Prof. Luke M. Froeb and David S. Sibley, and CE Senior Consultant Brijesh Pinto publish a forthcoming article in the Oxford Handbook on International Antitrust Economics entitled "Screening for Collusion as a Problem of Inference". The paper reviews the theoretical and empirical efforts to design screens, and finds that screens fail for one of three reasons: (i) the empirical indicator cannot distinguish between H0 and H1; (ii) H0 is not indicative of competition or H1 is not indicative of collusion; or (iii) the world is neither H0 nor H1.
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- CE Director Michael J. Doane, CE Academic Affiliates Prof. Luke M. Froeb and David S. Sibley, and CE Senior Consultant Brijesh Pinto publish a forthcoming article in the Oxford Handbook on International Antitrust Economics entitled "Screening for collusion as a problem of inference"