CE Director Dr. Michael A. Williams, Professor Tilman Klumpp, and Professor Hugo M. Mialon publish an article entitled “Leveling the playing field? The role of public campaign funding in elections” in the American Law and Economics Review.

 

In a series of First Amendment cases, the U.S. Supreme Court established that government may regulate campaign finance, but not if regulation imposes costs on political speech and the purpose of regulation is to “level the political playing field.” The Court has applied this principle to limit the ways in which governments can provide public campaign funding to candidates in elections. A notable example is the Court’s decision to strike down matching funds provisions of public funding programs (Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 2011). We present a contest-theoretic model of elections in which we analyze the effects of public campaign funding mechanisms, including a simple public option and a public option with matching funds, on program participation, political speech, and election outcomes.

 

This article was awarded the 2015 Distinguished Article Prize.