Competition Economics provides economic research and consulting services to law firms, corporations, and government agencies. The focus of our research and consulting is in four practice areas: antitrust, damages, intellectual property, and regulation.
Our directors and academic affiliates are distinguished experts in their respective fields and testify with authority on complex issues arising in business litigation and regulation in the United States and around the world.
CE Director Michael J. Doane, CE Academic Affiliates Prof. Luke M. Froeb and David S. Sibley, and CE Senior Consultant Brijesh Pinto publish a forthcoming article in the Oxford Handbook on International Antitrust Economics entitled “Screening for Collusion as a Problem of Inference”
CE Director Michael J. Doane, CE Academic Affiliates Prof. Luke M. Froeb and David S. Sibley, and CE Senior Consultant Brijesh Pinto publish a forthcoming article in the Oxford Handbook on International Antitrust Economics entitled “Screening for Collusion as a Problem of Inference”. The paper reviews the theoretical and empirical efforts to design screens, and finds that screens fail for one of three reasons: (i) the empirical indicator cannot distinguish between H0 and H1; (ii) H0 is not indicative of competition or H1 is not indicative of collusion; or (iii) the world is neither H0 nor H1.
CE Director Dr. Michael A. Williams, CE Academic Affiliate Prof. Ken Hendricks, and co-author Dr. R. Preston McAfee publish a forthcoming article in the Oxford Handbook on International Antitrust Economics entitled “Auctions and Bid Rigging”
CE Director Dr. Michael A. Williams, CE Academic Affiliate Prof. Ken Hendricks, and co-author Dr. R. Preston McAfee publish a forthcoming article in the Oxford Handbook on International Antitrust Economics entitled "Auctions and Bid Rigging." The paper provides a current survey of how economic theory and empirical research provide insights on bid rigging. In particular, the paper explains how firms engage in bid rigging and how bid rigging can be detected.
Competition Economics Assists State of New Hampshire in Obtaining $236 Million Judgment in MTBE Product Liability Case
In the matter of State of New Hampshire v. Hess Corp. et al., a New Hampshire jury determined that ExxonMobil Corp. should pay $236 million in damages after the jury found the company negligent for adding methyl tertiary butyl ether (“MTBE”) to gasoline which contaminated the state’s drinking water. CE staff, led by Director Michael A. Williams, assisted an Academic Affiliate who provided expert economic testimony on the distribution of gasoline and ExxonMobil’s wholesale gasoline share in New Hampshire, which was central to the jury’s damages calculations. Sher Leff LLC served as counsel for the State of New Hampshire.
U.S. District Court Awards Injunctive Relief and Injunctive Royalties to Skycam
In 2009 Competition Economics client Skycam, LLC brought suit against Actioncam and Patrick J. Bennett with allegations including trade secret misappropriation and violation of the Oklahoma Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
On September 27, 2012, Skycam was awarded injunctive relief and an injunctive royalty, citing the reasonable royalty rate opinion of Competition Economics Director Brett Reed.
This ruling follows a jury trial from September 2011, in which Skycam was awarded total damages of $594,000 on claims of breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, and unfair competition, in addition to punitive damages against Actioncam.
